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Abstract
This paper analyses the evolution of inequality in yearly and daily
wages between and within groups of blue and white collar, using the
INPS-ISFOL database for the period 1985-1999 in Italy. Between-
group inequality increased in the ’90s as clerical wages grew slowly
whereas blue collars wages remained nearly constant. Within-group
inequality increased only if measured by daily wages. The covariance
structure analysis shows that inequality comes from persistent differen-
tials among older workers and from high income volatility for younger
cohorts. Within inequalities in office and manual workers are driven
by the growth of permanency for the older cohorts (individual abilities,
say experience, matter more) and by the growth of income volatility for
the younger cohorts (luck in the labor market). Within each group,
low paid workers during their career acquire earning gains for their
abilities and reduce differentials with respect to high paid workers.
Keywords: Wage Inequality, Skill, Covariance Structure
JEL classification: J31, J62, C23, D31
1 Introduction
The increase in wage inequality in the US labour market has given rise to a
large body of theoretical and empirical analyses (Murphy and Welch, 1993
and Juhn et al., 1993). The theoretical explanations are mainly based on
the Skill Biased Technical Change hypothesis (SBTC thereafter, see Ace-
moglu, 2002) and have found a counterpart in the US labour market, where
∗Universita` Politecnica, delle Marche, Ancona, Italy. E-mail: m.lilla@univpm.it;
s.staffolani@univpm.it
Database utilization has been made possible by Authors partecipation in the research part-
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a strong empirical evidence of changes in relative market prices for skilled
and unskilled workers has been provided.
Other theoretical explanations than the one proposed by the SBTC hy-
pothesis can be found in economic literature. Particularly, product market
liberalization has played a role in inequality growth: increasing trade should
have changed the relative wage between skilled and unskilled workers (Wood,
1995). Nevertheless, the impact of trade liberalization on inequality seems
to be negligible when measured empirically (Richardson, 1995). Also insti-
tutional changes occurred in the last decades of the 20th century have played
a role. In Europe, labor market reforms aimed to raise flexibility1 and, in
the US, the falling minimum wage and the “deunionization” of workers can
explain the increase in wage inequality2.
Empirical analyses suggest that the increase in wage inequality is not
fully explained by observable workers’ characteristics (as educational level
and qualification, the “between group” inequality) but it also depends on
non-observable factors (the “residual” or the “within group” wage inequal-
ity.) that, interacting with technical and organizational change, determine
the increase in wage disparity between workers with similar observable char-
acteristics3.
Furthermore, the increase in within inequality - disparities between in-
dividuals with similar observable characteristics - may depend both on per-
manent shocks (changes in wages with a high degree of persistence) and
transitory ones (changes in wages which tend to last some periods and then
disappear).
This decomposition is fundamental in highlighting the role played by
increasing returns to scale of the “innate ability”, and the role played by
“luck” in the matching process. It is also important in determining the ef-
fects of inequality on welfare and for economic policy decisions. In fact, if the
increase in inequality (within groups) is mainly transitory, the explanations
based on a higher generality of the new information technologies (Aghion et
1The same technological change occurring in different institutions in the labor market
has given rise to different outcomes in Europe and in the United States. Because of
labour market rigidities, the common technological shock caused a pronounced effect on
employment in Europe (Ljunqvist and Sargent, 1998), while in the United States this
shock was mainly absorbed by prices, modifying the wage structure (Bertola and Ichino,
1995). Nevertheless, even in Europe wage distribution shifted towards rising inequality
(Glyn, (2001), Ayala et al. (2002)).
2See DiNardo et al. (1996) and Leslie and Pu (1995) for empirical support of this
viewpoint.
3To cope with this evidence, Aghion, Howitt and Violante (2002) relate “high gener-
ality” of new technology to the amplification of the role of luck in the labour market.
Furthermore, SBTC would have led to changes in firm organization and job tasks, from
centralized, non-flexible, hierarchical and large firm structures to horizontal structures
based on team work. Caroli and Van Reenen (2002) analyzed the effect of the process of
firm reorganization, that was driven by massive injection of information technologies, on
wage structure.
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al., 2002) become more important, suggesting policies aimed to boost the
matching process. However, aggregate demand could be negatively affected
by higher income volatility, calling for proper insurance schemes design4.
On the other hand, growing persistent inequalities could reveal that some
mechanisms other than technology are working5.
Some Authors have proposed measures for this decomposition among
transitory and permanent component of wage inequality. For the US, Mof-
fit and Gottshalk (2002) showed an increase in residual inequality for the
period 1970-1990. According to their results, persistent inequality grew in
the ’70s and ’80s, whereas transtitory inequality increased in the ’80s and
decreased in the following period. For the UK, Ramos (2003) found a fall in
the permanent component of inequality in the ’90s while the transitory one
turned out to be much persistent. For Germany, Biewen (2005) showed that
inequality was mainly characterized by the persistent component and that
in East Germany persistency grew until it reached the West German levels.
In Spain, during the ’90s, within inequality was almost stable. Its persis-
tent component grew whereas its transitory component declined, probably
because labour market reforms made temporary jobs more stable (Cervini
and Ramos, 2006).
In Italy a slight but constant increase in wage inequality occurred with
a delay of two decades with respect to the United States (Brandolini et al.,
2001, Manacorda, 2002, Bratti e Matteucci, 2004, Casavola et al., 1996).
Borgarello and Devicienti (2002), applying various econometric-based
decompositions, concluded that growth in inequality was mainly due to the
changing returns to observable workers’ characteristics.
Lilla (2005), using quantile regression on survey data (Bank of Italy
Survey on Household Income and Wealth), measured the role of education,
experience and qualification to explain the increase in overall wage inequal-
ity. These observable workers’ characteristics explained less than one half of
the total increase in inequality in many points of wage distribution, calling
for a deep investigation of the dynamics of within-group inequality.
Recently, thanks to the availability of longitudinal data (earnings pro-
files), some studies have analyzed the dynamics of wage inequality in Italy
by separating the differential due to persistent individual characteristics,
as ability and human capital, from the differential due to transitory com-
ponents. Analysing the differences between white collars employed in the
private and those in the public sector, Cappellari (2002) showed that the
volatility of earnings was higher in the private sector as regards the perma-
4Income inequality leads to consumption inequality, ending in different economic
growth patterns, see Blundell and Preston, 1998.
5Some facts should lead us to remark the impact of institutional change on inequality,
for instance the widespread use of temporary contracts that made young workers less
secure in their income than the older ones, lack of on-the-job training that reduces upward
mobility for less-qualified workers and so on.
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nent/transitory analysis . Moreover, Cappellari (2004) highlighted that the
increase in inequality was explained by the growth of permanent earning
component, which affected less-paid workers especially.
The aim of this paper is to highlight the dynamics of wage inequality in
Italy for blue and white collars in the last fifteen years of the last century.
We assume that both technology and institutional changes had played a
role in explaining it. The former should lead to inequality changes for all
workers’ cohorts, whereas the latter should make an impact especially on
younger workers. Therefore our analysis are performed on workers grouped
by cohorts.
Furthermore, we consider the white/blue collar classification as a proxy
of skilled/unskilled dichotomy and we use daily and yearly wages assuming
that the former refers more closely to productivity issues whereas the latter
allows welfare considerations. In all the above cases we decompose within
inequality in the permanent and transitory components. Therefore, our
analysis highlights the evolution of inequality for blue and white collars over
time in terms of worker productivity (permanent variability) and their luck
in the searching process (transitory variability).
We are aware that institutional changes in Italy have been fundamen-
tal in explaining labour market evolution in the last decades. According to
OECD (see OECD 2004) during the ’70 and the ’80th the employment pro-
tection legislation (EPL) in Italy was one of the strictest among European
countries. Individual firing, hiring rules, temporary and part time work were
regulated both by law and by collective agreements. Trade unions member-
ship and participation of workers in collective actions were both intense, and
collective bargaining was mainly centralized. Nevertheless, given that EPL
concentrated mostly on firms with at least 15 workers, some flexibility in
Italian labour market was guaranteed by the strong presence of small firms.
Since the mid ’80s, this institutional framework has changed. Since 1985
collective agreements have allowed for a widened use of temporary contracts.
During the following years some degree of flexibility came from bargaining,
and in 1997 the “Treu reform” institutionalized these changes by weakening
the regulation on fixed term contracts. During the last 20 years, therefore,
Italian labour market has surely become more flexible and, in this way, low-
paid workers have become less guaranteed not only in terms of job security
but also in terms of wage levels.
Italian industrial relation, since the “marcia dei quarantamila” 6 appears
to be less favorable to unions, that had to face a strong decline in member-
ship and participation (see Baici and Samek Lodovici, page 68). In 1993
the government and social partners signed the “Protocollo sulla politica dei
6In 1984, in Turin, 40,000 white collar workers and managers of the FIAT demon-
strated against the 35-day-strike decided by the FLM (the most important union in the
metallurgical sector in Italy) in order to avoid 15,000 dismissals.
4
Page 4 of 28
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
redditi e dell’occupazione” that gave rise to a period of calm in industrial
relation and introduced in bargaining the method of “concertazione”, (some
degree of corporatism that, in fact, generated some sort of cooperative be-
haviour) and the two-tier bargaining system, both at sectoral and firm level.
Given that one of the main goals of italian trade unions concerned reduc-
ing wage inequality between skills, the loss of union power can probably be
considered one of the “institutional factors” that increases inequality.
Our analysis concludes that inequality in Italy has grown mainly be-
cause of the increasing differences in the wage “between” blue collars and
white collars and marginally because of an increase in inequality “within”
qualifications, but only if evaluated on daily (and not yearly) wages. Low
wage blue collars (the 10th percentile) have seen their real revenue falling
in the early ’90s. Younger cohorts suffer a higher degree of inequality than
workers born in the ’40s and ’50s. Within group inequality in yearly wages
is explained mainly by individual abilities for older cohorts and by a higher
degree of uncertainty for young workers. Office workers show higher persis-
tence in inequality than manual workers. Daily wages show different trends:
the increase in within group inequality is much higher for younger cohorts,
whereas for older manual workers, the increase in inequality comes mainly
from the growing differentials in reward for individual abilities.
The paper is organized as follows: in the second section we present the
database. In the third section we offer a brief description of the evolution
of wage inequality using the blue collar/white collar dichotomy. We also
measure wage evolution by cohorts of individuals born in the period be-
tween 1939 and 1968. In the fourth section wage variability is decomposed
into permanent (due to individual characteristics, modelized by a random-
growth process) and transitory components (a less persistent component due
to individual shocks and to the matching process) for white and blue col-
lars. Model estimation, which therefore considers both the long run growth
and short run fluctuations, allows us to measure permanent and transitory
component of wage inequality. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Data
The Italian Institute for National Social Security (INPS thereafter) collects
data on all Italian workers employed in the private sector (except agricul-
ture) through an administrative procedure based on firms’ declarations. Be-
cause of the administrative nature of the data, only little information is
collected on workers. Annual gross wages7, weeks and days of work, gender,
age, qualification, sector, region of work are available but, unfortunately,
educational levels, family composition and family background are missing.
7Gross wages are the sum of net wages, taxes and social contributions on workers;
social contributions on firms are not included in gross wages.
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Data are available from 1985 to 1999.
We use a sample of the whole dataset rearranged by ISFOL8. This sample
collects information on all workers born the 10th of March, June, September
and December of each year, so that 1 worker out of about 91 is included in
the sample9. The longitudinal structure of the database allows us to analyze
permanent and transitory components of the total variability of wages.
We extract a sub-sample from the database. First of all, we consider only
male population because of the specificity of entry and exit flows of women
in the labor market which may affect wage variability. Secondly, in order
to avoid starting and ending points of working careers, we consider only
workers born between 1939 and 1968. Finally we drop outlier observations
in wages truncating the yearly and daily wage distributions at the bottom
and top 0.1%10.
Therefore our sample is composed of 116, 303 individuals and of 864, 567
observations. 569, 710 of them refer to blue collars and 294, 867 to white
collars. In our sample we observe 12, 898 transitions between the two cat-
egories of workers, concerning 11.1% of the individuals. Observations re-
garding these cases are nevertheless included in the sample for the relative
period of their working career11
Table 1 shows the number of presences of workers in our (unbalanced)
panel. 21, 631 individuals with only one observation therefore contribute to
cross-sectional analysis alone.
We use the “Consumption price index for family of white and blue col-
lars” (ISTAT) to deflate gross nominal wages of the ISFOL database.
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics of real wage data for total ob-
servations and distinguishes the between component, obtained by the vari-
ability of revenue between individuals and the within component, obtained
by the variability of revenue in time for the same individual12. Notice that
the standard deviation within is lower than the standard deviation between
for the yearly wages but not for the daily wages.
According to the date of birth, blue and white collar workers have been
collected in ten cohorts. Each cohort is composed of workers born within a 3-
8Istituto per lo sviluppo della formazione professionale dei lavoratori, Institute for
Training Workers
9For a detailed description of the dataset, see Centra and Rustichelli (2005)
10In that way, we drop 7657 observations, that is a higher number than the expected one,
(0.2% of the whole sample) firstly because we drop observations where the yearly or daily
wage was in one of the two tails described above and secondly because all individuals
with zero wages were obviously included in the lower percentile. In fact, we drop 441
individuals whose observations were in the two tails for the whole period.
11In fact, we consider these workers as two different individuals for the sub-period of
their career. Individuals with the same qualification but with different jobs during the
same year are also considered because our analysis leaves aside job characteristics; their
yearly revenue is the sum of revenues in the different jobs.
12Calculated as revenue of the individual - average revenue of the individual + average
global revenue, so that it can be negative.
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Table 1: Number of presences of workers in the panel data
number of presences Freq. Percent Cum.
1 21,631 18.6 18.6
2 10,063 8.65 27.25
3 6,884 5.92 33.17
4 5,906 5.08 38.25
5 5,644 4.85 43.1
6 5,090 4.38 47.48
7 6,452 5.55 53.03
8 4,690 4.03 57.06
9 5,027 4.32 61.38
10 4,757 4.09 65.47
11 4,641 3.99 69.46
12 5,502 4.73 74.19
13 6,394 5.5 79.69
14 10,240 8.8 88.49
15 13,382 11.51 100
Total 116,303 100
Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data.
Table 2: Yearly and daily wages for blue and white collars; between and
within components; thousand of Italian lire, base 1999
constant wage-base 1999 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
blue collars overall 28152 15162 1 3362295 N = 569710
yearly wages between 14135 35 564056 n = 86759
within 8752 -535634 2826391 T-bar = 6.56658
white collars overall 52899 35289 1 1131491 N = 294867
yearly wages between 31525 40 684533 n = 42442
within 16252 -386316 963147 T-bar = 6.94753
blue collars overall 128 177 1 74631 N = 569710
daily wages between 90 2 10831 n = 86759
within 161 -9634 66317 T-bar = 6.56658
white collars overall 203 255 1 80232 N = 294867
daily wages between 200 1 21760 n = 42442
within 203 -21403 60320 T-bar = 6.94753
Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data
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Figure 1: Median real daily and yearly wages, blue and white collars
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Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data.
year range. These cohorts represent the base for the analysis of the following
sections. Tables 5 and 6 in the Appendix show the sample composition for
blue and white collars with respect to cohorts and years.
3 The evolution of wage inequality in Italy
In the period 1985-1999, real wages moved cyclically around a slightly in-
creasing trend but, especially for blue collars, in some periods real wages
decreased. This reduction was more pronounced for daily wages than for
annual wages. Blue collars’ purchasing power kept growing until 1991, but
later it remained nearly constant whereas white collars’ purchasing power
grew in the whole period, but at decreasing rate in the last decade (see figure
1, that shows median wages for the two groups of workers; average wages
-not shown in this paper- moved in a similar manner as median wages).
These patterns led to an increasing wage gap between the two groups of
workers, as shown in figure 2 that plots the percentile ratios between blue
and white collars. This gap increases during the whole period both for daily
and yearly real wages, particularly for the “poorest” workers. As regards
8
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Figure 2: Real daily and yearly wages, ratio between white and blue collars
for the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles
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Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data
Figure 3: Real daily wages, blue collars, 10th percentile
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low-wages blue collars, real wages strongly decreased in the early ’90s; in
1999 their wages were lower than in 1988, see figure 3)13).
Within group inequality measured by daily real wages grew for white
collars, mainly if measured by the ratio between the 90th and the 10th
percentiles, but remained stable if measured by yearly wages. Probably,
low-wage workers, in order to compensate the shut in the daily earnings,
increased their job attachment, working a higher number of days during the
year (see figure 5). When we measure working days by percentiles, who
worked less raised working days in the whole period as figure 4 shows.
13For the United States DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) analyzed the relationship
between the reduction in minimum wages and inequality
9
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Figure 4: Working days, lowest percentiles and median, blue and white
collars
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Figure 5: Real daily and yearly wages, percentile ratios, blue and white
collars
daily, blue collars daily, white collars
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The Gini index is displayed in figure 6 for blue collars, white collars and
all workers. The figure on the left shows daily real wages, the one on the
right shows yearly wages. Inequality measured by daily wages grew both
within categories and for the whole population. Inequality in yearly wages
was stable within white collars whereas it was slightly reduced within blue
collars. The Gini index for the whole population confirms that inequality
between blue and white collars increased during the ’90s.
Figures 11 and 12 in the Appendix show earning profiles (yearly wages)
by cohorts (defined on a three year birth date period) and by ages14. White
collars’ earning profiles result upward sloping with respect to age (except
for older workers born in the period 1939-1942 who show a constant sloping
after the age of 50th.). Instead, blue collars earning profiles are upward
sloping for younger cohorts but with a sort of reverse “U” shape for older
cohorts, with a maximum at around the age of 50th.
Figures 13 and 14 in the Appendix show the ratio between the median
real wage of white collars and blue collars, distinguishing by cohort and age,
respectively for daily and yearly wages. It clearly emerges that inequality
between the two groups is higher for older workers both on daily and yearly
basis.
Nevertheless, the between-group inequality (ratio between white and
blue collars median wages) is higher for cohorts born more recently. There-
fore, inequality grows with the worker’s age and it is higher for younger
cohorts.
4 Permanency and volatility in wage inequality
The covariance structure of individual wages can be investigated thanks
to the panel nature of the dataset. In this section we decompose the total
variability of individual earnings into permanent and transitory components.
We apply this decomposition separately for four subsets of data, for white
and blue collars and yearly and daily wages.
In order to perform this decomposition:
• in a first step, we have to refine the raw earnings. In particular, real
log-wages have been regressed on a 4th degree polynomial of age in-
teracted with cohorts and year dummies, separately for office workers
and manual workers and for yearly and daily wages. Then we use the
residuals of such OLS regressions to perform the permanent-transitory
variance decomposition.
14To improve visibility, we do not plot observations with a yearly wage lower than
25,000,000 Italian lire. Doing so, we drop observation concerning younger cohorts in their
youth.
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Figure 6: Real daily and yearly wages, Gini index
daily yearly
0.200
0.250
0.300
0.350
85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99
blue collars
white collars
all workers
0.200
0.250
0.300
0.350
85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99
blue collars
white collars
all workers
Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data
• in a second step, we calculate the empirical variance-covariance matrix
of such residuals distinguished by the four subsets.15.
• in a third step we modelize the earning process into permanent and
transitory components, where, from this point onward, by earnings we
mean the residuals of the first stage regressions.
The simplest way to model the earning process is shown in equation 1:
ωi,t = µi + νi,t µi ∼ (0, σ2µ) νi ∼ (0, σ2ν) E(µi, νi) = 0 (1)
where income is divided into an individual fixed intercept (µi) and a white-
noise error term (νi,t). Therefore, we can write the implied covariance struc-
ture (Σ) as:
E(ωi,tωi,k) =
{
σ2µ + σ2ν if t = k
σ2µ otherwise
Although this specification is clearly unsuitable to model the earning
process, we estimate this simple covariance structure. The transitory com-
ponent accounts for 60% and 64% of white and blue collars total inequality
in yearly wages. The permanent component should measure individual abil-
ities and in the previous model it was assumed to be constant over time.
This last hypothesis seems to be unrealistic, therefore we split the perma-
nent component in an individual fixed intercept and a variable one varying
with experience (random-growth model). Equation 1 becomes:
ωPi,t = µi + γiai,t
15We have 10 cohorts and 120 distinct elements in each variance-covariance matrix
(T = 15, so T · (T + 1)/2 = 120). As such the analysis is based on 1200 measured
covariances for each subset of data
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and the earning process is written as:
ωi,t = µi + γiai,t + νi,t(
µi
γi
)
∼
[(
0
0
)
,
(
σ2µ σµγ
σ2γ
)]
Until now, the transitory component has been modeled as serially uncor-
related, implying that the shock which hits permanent earning in one period
disappears immediately in the next one. To take into account some degree
of persistence of temporary shocks on earnings, we model the transitory
component as an AR(1) autoregressive process:
νi,t = ρνi,t−1 + ǫi,t ǫi ∼ (0, σ2ǫ) νi,0 ∼ (0, σ20)
hence, the model can be written as:
ωi,t = (µi + γiai,t) + (ρνi,t−1 + ǫi,t) (2)
In this way the temporary shock may last more than one period. Higher
values of the parameter ρ imply major degrees of uncertainty and a higher
persistence of deviations from the permanent component. The model in
equation 2 can be extended to consider explicitly the effects on earnings of
economic cycles and secular growth. We introduce these changes by multi-
plying the two components for time (π and τ) and cohort (κ and λ) 16:
ωi,c,t = κcπt(µi + γiai,t) + λcτt(ρνi,t−1 + ǫi,t)
so that the implied theoretical covariance structure can now be written as:
E(ωPi,tω
P
i,k) = σ2µ + a¯ta¯kσ2γ + (a¯t + a¯k)σγµ
E(νi,tνi,k) =


σ20 if t = k = 0
σ2ǫ + ρ2E(νi,t−1νi,t−1) if t = k > 0
ρ2E(νi,t−1νi,k) otherwise
f(ψ) =
10∑
c=1
ccκc2
{
15∑
t=1
15∑
k=t
ptπtpkπk(σ2µ + a¯ta¯kσ2γ + (a¯t + a¯k)σγµ)
}
+
+
10∑
c=1
ccλc2
{
15∑
t=1
15∑
k=t
ptτtpkτkE(νi,tνi,k)
}
16Cappellari, 2002, used this formulation to compare the covariance structure of white
collars between private and public sector.
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where ψ is the vector of parameters to be estimated, f(ψ) is the theo-
retical - implied by the earning process model - covariance function, cc is a
dummy for cohorts and pt is a dummy for years
17.
Equation 3 can be estimated through a GMM estimator: the minimum
distance estimator proposed by Chamberlain (1984).
More specifically, when we estimate the model minimizing the sum of
the squares of the differences between the empirical (E(ωictωick)) and the
theoretical second moments (f(ψ)), weighted by the inverse matrix of the
forth moments, we get an asymptotically efficient estimator (Chamberlain
(1984)). In this case, the estimator is the optimally minimum distance esti-
mator (OMD). Altonji e Segal (1996) showed that weighting by the identity
matrix (instead of the inverse matrix of the forth moments) we get a more
efficient estimator than the OMD estimator, namely the equally weighted
minimum distance (EWMD) estimator. Table 3 shows EWMD estimates on
yearly wages for blue and white collars and table 4 shows estimates on daily
wages.
By estimating the parameters of the theoretical structure of earning sec-
ond moments, we find that, both for yearly and daily wages, permanency
in inequality mainly comes from the high variability in the initial individual
abilities (σi). Blue collars show higher levels of σi. Given that the sign
of the covariance between the two components of the permanent part of
earning process (σγµ) is negative, as time goes on the dispersion of individ-
ual abilities diminishes: initially low-talented workers grow their individual
abilities faster than high-talented ones 18. The degree of permanency of the
transitory shock (ρ)is small, especially for blue collars, for both yearly and
daily wages: shocks last for 3-4 years, then disappear.
In order to get some insight on the differences among cohorts, figures
7, 8, 9 and 10 show total, permanent and transitory inequality obtained by
EWMD estimates, plotted over time, distinctly for blue and white collars,
for each cohort.
Manual workers show stable inequality in yearly earnings, with a little
downward trend in the late ′80s and an upward trend in the late ′90s. More
specifically, inequality grows for older workers and decreases for younger
cohorts. Long-term inequality (wage inequality due to persistent differences
in workers abilities) becomes more important in explaining total inequality
until the middle ′90s, especially for the older cohorts. Transitory inequality
increases its role in explaining wage variability for younger blue collars.
Inequality in yearly wages remains almost stable also for white collars
even if a diminishing trend is ascertained for the younger cohorts. Looking
17MaCurdy, 1982, analyzed several stochastic specifications for the earning process in
the USA, in order to better characterize the covariance structure. Similarly, Borella, 2001,
for the Italian earnings, on SHIW data.
18Low-talented workers catch-up with high-talented ones by means of a higher wage
growth rate during their career.
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at the two components of inequality, volatility is the major source of in-
equality for the younger cohorts whereas growing permanency characterizes
inequality within the older white collars cohorts.
Daily wages inequality increases dramatically for both white and blue
collars in the ′90s. For older manual workers and younger office workers we
measure a major rise in inequality. Permanent inequality increases for older
workers, while inequality among younger cohorts is mainly driven by tran-
sitory inequality. Shocks have a low degree of permanency in the transitory
component, especially for blue collars.
Summing up, within inequalities in yearly wages are almost constant,
and they are explained mainly by persistent differentials among older work-
ers and high income volatility for younger cohorts. We observe different ev-
idence in daily wages, calling for the dynamics of labor attachment: within
inequality grows, dramatically with respect to younger workers. Older blue
collars inequality is mainly explained by their individual abilities. As σµγ is
negative, low-paid blue and white collars increase their permanent income
component faster than well-paid ones. Within inequalities among white col-
lars and blue collars are driven by the growth of permanency for the older
cohorts (individual abilities, say experience, matter more) and by the growth
of volatility for the younger cohorts (luck in the labor market). Within each
group, low paid workers see their earnings grow faster than well-paid workers
during their career.
5 Concluding remarks
In the previous sections we showed evidence of wage inequality in the period
1985-1999. We measured inequalities in yearly and daily wages between
and within blue and white collars and with respect to cohorts. We also
decompose within inequality into permanent and transitory components.
Between-group inequality increased in the ′90s as white collar wages
grew slowly whereas blue collar wages remained nearly constant. Its growth
is much stronger if measured with respect to the bottom of income distribu-
tion: low-paid blue collars’ real earnings fall in the ′90s. Wage differentials
increased much more for younger cohorts. These results can be explained
by two combined phenomena that occurred in the italian labour market:
the changing skill-premia (increase in relative yearly wage between qualifi-
cations and the growing differentials in productivity) and the reforms aimed
to raise labour market flexibility through the use of temporary contracts
(the differences between cohorts in inequality patterns).
Within-group inequality increased only in daily wages but not in yearly
wages because low-paid blue collars responded to daily earning changes by
raising their job attachment.
By decomposing residual inequality we showed that both white and blue
15
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collars’ yearly wage differentials come mainly from persistent differences
which characterize the earning process of older cohorts and from a higher
volatility for younger workers. Office workers show higher persistence in
inequality than manual workers19. These are puzzling results: general pur-
pose technologies should lead to major volatility in wages, regardless of
skills or experience. Other theoretical hypotheses, based on trade liberation
and changes in labor market institution, may highlight these results. Daily
wages show different trends: we measure an increase in within-group inequal-
ity which is much stronger for the younger cohorts. Increase in inequality
depends on growing differentials in individual abilities’ rewards, especially
for older manual workers. Assuming that daily wages reflect labor produc-
tivity, growing within inequalities, driven by the persistent component, are
coherent with the SBTC hypothesis: within groups, non observable skills
(education, tenure, experience and so on) get growing wage premia.
Summing up, the picture presented above shows increasing differentials
in productivity between and within different workers’ qualifications. Those
who felt their relative daily wage declining, responded to price changes
through quantities, increasing the working-days per year constantly. So
inequality increase in yearly wages was mitigated.
Disparities between similar workers become more and more persistent
for the older ones because they were probably less touched by the labor
market flexibility policies. Inequality among younger workers turned out
to be much more volatile and their job mobility increased. As we said
before, institutional factors and technological shocks together can explain
these findings.
Policies aimed to reduce market rigidities can result in an overshoot on
some segments of the labor force - say less paid or young workers - while
have little effect on the whole labour market. The increase in persistent
inequality as long as the fall in the real wage of low-income workers call
for deeper investigations. Further studies should analyse household income
(instead of individual one) in order to understand how it responds to changes
in wage premia by means of labour market participation and working time
of households members. Besides, consumption (instead of income) should
be evaluated in order to assess the impact of uncertainty on demand and
savings.
19Cappellari (2002) found that white collars wages in the public sector are even more
persistent. Greater insider bargaining power along with the higher endowment in skill
could be the reasons for this result.
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Table 3: EWMD estimates on yearly wages
PERMANENT TRANSITORY
blue-collars white-collars blue-collars white-collars
σ2
µ
1,49890 0,39658 ρ 0,11775 0,18642
0,12089 0,02492 0,00657 0,01106
σ2γ 0,00051 0,00045 σ
2
0
0,55801 0,43922
0,00004 0,00003 0,01652 0,02303
σγµ -0,02685 -0,01245 σ2ǫ 0,22596 0,34528
0,00222 0,00076 0,05350 0,09223
1942-1944 0,99913 1,00029 1942-1944 1,01359 0,92322
0,01402 0,01219 0,01692 0,03439
1945-1947 0,90006 1,04516 1945-1947 0,99007 0,91608
0,01734 0,01430 0,01695 0,03443
1948-1950 0,81367 1,11524 1948-1950 0,97431 0,93959
0,02037 0,01732 0,01698 0,03432
1951-1953 0,78253 1,29116 1951-1953 1,04449 1,04492
0,02328 0,02157 0,01703 0,03431
1954-1956 0,69901 1,45735 1954-1956 1,09849 1,17206
0,02364 0,02847 0,01716 0,03519
1957-1959 0,63543 1,75370 1957-1959 1,13115 1,28516
0,02339 0,04023 0,01727 0,03661
1960-1962 0,59119 1,89427 1960-1962 1,19658 1,43628
0,02303 0,05492 0,01758 0,03901
1963-1965 0,49536 1,85084 1963-1965 1,25832 1,54089
0,02026 0,06467 0,01793 0,04088
1966-1968 0,43548 1,80187 1966-1968 1,31966 1,77847
0,01842 0,06575 0,01834 0,04542
1986 1,03900 0,97779 1986 1,44669 0,93799
0,02708 0,03305 0,16668 0,12016
1987 1,09904 0,97625 1987 1,44620 0,91980
0,02899 0,03351 0,17135 0,12260
1988 1,15530 1,00084 1988 1,39996 0,87777
0,03031 0,03375 0,16593 0,11698
1989 1,23537 0,93268 1989 1,30400 0,82828
0,03176 0,03187 0,15532 0,11050
1990 1,30271 0,98845 1990 -1,29657 0,79837
0,03343 0,03262 0,15444 0,10666
1991 1,36353 0,95911 1991 -1,32951 0,78511
0,03545 0,03166 0,15769 0,10493
1992 1,40556 0,96405 1992 -1,31759 0,73309
0,03708 0,03151 0,15615 0,09834
1993 1,54345 0,97974 1993 -1,29199 0,74670
0,04045 0,03166 0,15333 0,10003
1994 1,71641 0,96580 1994 -1,27189 0,73940
0,04450 0,03120 0,15176 0,09911
1995 1,80328 0,93808 1995 1,25450 0,74730
0,04766 0,03044 0,14977 0,10009
1996 1,72681 0,93143 1996 1,29977 0,72429
0,04813 0,03017 0,15419 0,09721
1997 1,74046 0,88792 1997 1,30478 0,72098
0,05029 0,02907 0,15460 0,09682
1998 1,71289 0,87820 1998 1,33749 0,74565
0,05152 0,02873 0,15844 0,10002
1999 1,76558 0,90332 1999 1,31623 0,74583
0,05441 0,02922 0,15621 0,10016
Blue-collars obs: 569710 RSS=1.48803 F(52,1148)= 1850.99
White-collars obs: 294867 RSS=2.18526 F(1148)= 1005.56
Note: regressions based on 1200 empirical covariances; asymptotic standard errors in italic;
references: cohort 1939-41, year 1985.
Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data
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Table 4: EWMD estimates on daily wages
PERMANENT TRANSITORY
Blue-collars White-collars Blue-collars White-collars
σ2
µ
0,04899 0,11583 ρ 0,11447 0,29528
0,00298 0,00915 0,00878 0,01324
σ2γ 0,00007 0,00023 σ
2
0
0,09417 0,09849
0,00000 0,00001 0,00381 0,00576
σγµ -0,00177 -0,00488 σ2ǫ 0,02005 0,05341
0,00010 0,00031 0,00600 0,01462
1942-1944 1,07379 1,02684 1942-1944 1,04413 0,99922
0,01101 0,00484 0,02168 0,03205
1945-1947 1,11010 1,04587 1945-1947 1,01326 0,96521
0,01267 0,00604 0,02165 0,03210
1948-1950 1,23883 1,09531 1948-1950 1,01394 1,01483
0,01500 0,00796 0,02165 0,03207
1951-1953 1,45051 1,17730 1951-1953 1,05141 1,02293
0,01870 0,01083 0,02171 0,03210
1954-1956 1,67168 1,27544 1954-1956 1,08190 1,09312
0,02473 0,01502 0,02181 0,03236
1957-1959 1,93134 1,39988 1957-1959 1,11581 1,09938
0,03448 0,02103 0,02197 0,03245
1960-1962 2,12698 1,48396 1960-1962 1,14532 1,18709
0,04811 0,02885 0,02218 0,03322
1963-1965 2,16001 1,56681 1963-1965 1,20683 1,20827
0,06245 0,03887 0,02264 0,03373
1966-1968 2,24158 1,49705 1966-1968 1,29617 1,26435
0,07419 0,04816 0,02337 0,03466
1986 1,03132 0,97662 1986 1,94102 1,16651
0,02939 0,01454 0,27941 0,13894
1987 1,06945 1,02390 1987 -1,94390 1,19611
0,03014 0,01488 0,29265 0,16481
1988 1,04298 1,02611 1988 -1,96699 1,18833
0,02941 0,01491 0,29556 0,16553
1989 1,02658 1,00978 1989 -1,97117 1,14347
0,02884 0,01479 0,29588 0,15958
1990 1,03525 1,01369 1990 -2,00874 1,15802
0,02877 0,01489 0,30127 0,16122
1991 1,02249 0,98417 1991 -1,98129 1,11518
0,02835 0,01468 0,29717 0,15551
1992 1,00927 0,98656 1992 -1,90793 1,07159
0,02798 0,01482 0,28638 0,14982
1993 1,00730 1,01220 1993 -1,92916 1,09898
0,02788 0,01523 0,28941 0,15318
1994 0,99551 0,98900 1994 -1,92990 1,12484
0,02762 0,01509 0,28946 0,15635
1995 0,98766 0,97871 1995 -1,94928 1,14173
0,02745 0,01509 0,29233 0,15842
1996 0,95218 0,95906 1996 -1,96511 1,18426
0,02662 0,01496 0,29510 0,16381
1997 0,95231 0,97950 1997 -1,89153 1,14884
0,02640 0,01531 0,28635 0,15944
1998 0,90094 0,91101 1998 2,13955 1,29286
0,02534 0,01455 0,32266 0,17838
1999 0,83893 0,90636 1999 2,32043 1,43017
0,02410 0,01461 0,34811 0,19660
Blue-collars: obs: 569710 RSS=0.09511 F(1148)= 1488.28
White-collars obs: 294867 RSS=0.21304 F(1148)= 3328.95
Note: regressions based on 1200 empirical covariances; asymptotic standard errors in italic;
references: cohort 1939-41, year 1985.
Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data
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Figure 7: EWMD estimates on yearly wages, blue collars
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Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data
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Figure 8: EWMD estimates on yearly wages, white collars
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Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data
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Figure 9: EWMD estimates on daily wages, blue collars
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Graphs by cohort
Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data
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Figure 10: EWMD estimates on daily wages, white collars
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000
39−41 42−44
45−47 47−50
51−53 54−56
57−59 60−62
63−65 66−68
total permanent transitory
to
ta
l,
 p
e
rm
a
n
e
n
t 
a
n
d
 t
ra
n
s
it
o
ry
 e
s
ti
m
a
te
d
 i
n
e
q
u
a
li
ti
e
s
anno
Graphs by cohort
Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data
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Appendix: Table and figures by cohorts
Table 5: Blue collars by cohort and year
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
1939-1941 3045 3612 3543 3505 3398 3031 3021 2780
1942-1944 2712 3233 3206 3148 3040 2818 2859 2805
1945-1947 3090 3770 3669 3647 3607 3310 3400 3325
1948-1950 3259 3912 3825 3735 3690 3336 3467 3427
1951-1953 3132 3557 3453 3497 3406 3089 3213 3214
1954-1956 3435 3799 3770 3711 3614 3364 3495 3368
1957-1959 3923 4227 4249 4151 4065 3807 3974 3864
1960-1962 4386 4704 4759 4812 4700 4522 4789 4647
1963-1965 4447 5120 5502 5636 5540 5449 5706 5557
1966-1968 3725 3957 4415 4957 5553 5577 5915 5842
total 35154 39891 40391 40799 40613 38303 39839 38829
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
1939-1941 2760 2437 1975 1744 1400 1061 959 38271
1942-1944 2931 2723 2307 2149 1644 1354 1257 38186
1945-1947 3590 3472 3429 3274 3014 2608 2390 49595
1948-1950 3777 3681 3618 3606 3442 3118 3285 53178
1951-1953 3467 3373 3377 3336 3251 2902 3083 49350
1954-1956 3743 3676 3676 3609 3548 3149 3412 53369
1957-1959 4150 4062 4056 4011 3960 3473 3804 59776
1960-1962 4762 4636 4646 4622 4546 4151 4512 69194
1963-1965 5555 5407 5388 5405 5252 4823 5281 80068
1966-1968 5669 5566 5589 5674 5609 5087 5588 78723
total 40404 39033 38061 37430 35666 31726 33571 569710
Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data
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Table 6: White collars by cohort and year
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
1939-1941 1369 1907 1820 1791 1710 1619 1664 1577
1942-1944 1391 1902 1791 1755 1744 1663 1716 1686
1945-1947 1757 2361 2247 2215 2149 2073 2173 2148
1948-1950 1867 2424 2313 2283 2273 2119 2245 2207
1951-1953 1814 2290 2169 2159 2137 1992 2081 2079
1954-1956 1802 2228 2123 2116 2152 2018 2133 2101
1957-1959 1701 2178 2213 2273 2308 2224 2328 2282
1960-1962 1168 1587 1776 1980 2086 2096 2276 2277
1963-1965 610 1077 1383 1798 2002 2145 2427 2588
1966-1968 108 254 502 826 1199 1482 1836 1975
total 13587 18208 18337 19196 19760 19431 20879 20920
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
1939-1941 1555 1433 1202 1122 908 614 475 20766
1942-1944 1769 1689 1544 1463 1339 1045 892 23389
1945-1947 2308 2268 2210 2164 2073 1678 1547 31371
1948-1950 2410 2396 2357 2331 2315 1978 1907 33425
1951-1953 2306 2290 2271 2259 2217 1882 1847 31793
1954-1956 2298 2269 2198 2205 2216 1871 1811 31541
1957-1959 2500 2441 2414 2414 2377 2046 2013 33712
1960-1962 2410 2397 2403 2378 2343 1985 2075 31237
1963-1965 2745 2745 2767 2750 2760 2392 2568 32757
1966-1968 2153 2204 2376 2441 2589 2368 2563 24876
total 22454 22132 21742 21527 21137 17859 17698 294867
Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data
Figure 11: Earning profiles by cohort, yearly wages, blue collars, median
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Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data
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Figure 12: Earning profiles by cohort, yearly wages, white collars, median
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Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data
Figure 13: Ratio betweeen white and blue collar median daily wages, by
cohorts
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Source: panel ISFOL on INPS data
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Figure 14: Ratio betweeen white and blue collar median yearly wages, by
cohorts
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